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PROPOSED RULE 146--A TEMPORARY SOLUTION
MuRRAY L. FINEBAUM*

Imagine yourself as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission asked to give the keynote address to 1,200 lawyers attending a
...
conference on securities law. What would you talk about?
Stock exchange commission rates? Corporate reforms? Institutional
membership? Broker-dealer financialproblems?
The private offering exemption.

The private offering exemption?'

T

he Chairman's selection of the private offering exemption of section

4 (2) of the Securities Act of 19332 as a speech topic last year confirmed the view of many commentators that the need for greater
certainty in this area is pressing.3 The Commission has taken a step

in the proper direction by proposing Rule 146. 4 It is the purpose of
this article to briefly review the development of the so-called "private

offering exemption" contained in section 4 (2) ; its current status; the
provisions of proposed Rule 146; and, the approach contained in the
American Law Institute's Securities Code, Tentative Draft No. 1. 5

I. THE PAST
A. Adoption of the SecuritiesAct
The statutes enacted by Congress from 1933 to 19406 dealing with
securities regulation "were adopted piecemeal . . . inevitably pro* Member, California and New York Bars. B.A., City College of New York,
1962; J.D., New York University, 1965.
1. [1972] BNA, SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 144, at B-1.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
3. [1972] BNA, No. 144, supra note 1, at B-7. In 1966 one commentator noted
sadly that "[f]or all of the Act's accumulation of history and acceptance, the problems
of application and interpretation have increased rather than decreased as the years have
passed." Meer, The Private Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act-A
Study in Administrative and Judicial Contradiction,20 Sw. L.J. 503 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Meer].
4. SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Release No. 5336].
5. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
6. Investment Co. Act of 1940, 11 U.S.C. §§ 72, 107 (1970), 15 U.S.C. §§
8(a) (1)-(52) (1970); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-(aa) (1970);'Trust
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duc[ing] a patchwork effect, with serious gaps here and serious over'7
laps there.
When the first of these statutes-the Securities Act of 1933was adopted, the nation was struggling with the most serious financial
crisis in its history. "From 1920 to 1933 some $50 billion of securities
were sold in the United States. By 1933 half were worthless."8 Within
two and one-half years the aggregate value of securities listed on the
New York Stock Exchange was reduced by $74 billion-from $89
billion on September 1, 1929 to $15 billion in 1932. 9 President Roosevelt stated in a message to Congress on March 29, 1933 that

[t]here is . . . an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new
securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by
full publicity and information, and that no essentially important
element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying
public. 10
The Act generally requires registration of all offerings of securities,11
in order "to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions."' 2 Section
4 (2) of the Act exempts from registration "transactions by an issuer
not involving any public offering." The Act, however, fails to define
"public offering." The legislative history of the Act provides little
enlightenment aside from comments that registration is not required
"where there is no practical need for its application or where the
public benefits are too remote."' 13 The House Report states that the
exemption provided by section 4 (2) permits "an issuer to make a
specific or isolated sale of its securities to a particular person," but
indicates that it is not available for sales or offerings "made generally
Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(aaa)-(bbb) (1970); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)-(e),(j),(k),(m),(o),(s), 78(a)-(o),(o)(3),(p)-(hh)
(1970); Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79(a)-(z)(6) (1970);

Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(b)(1)-(21) (1970).
7. Loss, History of S.E.C. Legislative Programs and Suggestions for a Code, 22
Bus. LAW. 795 (1967).
8. 1 L. Loss, SEcuRiT S REGULATION 120 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter

cited as Loss].
9. Id.
10. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
12. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
13. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933); see 1 Loss, supra note 8.
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to the public."' 4 One of the draftsmen of the Act stated that he and
his colleagues intended to cover only
"[p]ublic offerings" as distinguished from "private offerings" . .. .
The sale of an issue of securities to insurance companies or to a

limited group of experienced investors, was certainly not a matter of
concern to the federal government. 15
B. Development of the Section 4(2) Exemption
The parameters of the private placement exemption were less
than clear ab initio-perhaps by design-considering the diverse
frauds perpetrated prior to its adoption.:6 Nevertheless, due to the
expenses accompanying a registered offering,' 7 "the economic need
for reliance on the private offering exemption by small and moderate
sized business concerns has increased rather than diminished through
the years,"' 5 despite a "continuous tug of war between Commission
and bar as to whether new, borderline situations belong on one side
or the other of the all-important boundary."' 9
In 1935, the Commission's General Counsel issued an opinion
concerning the section 4 (2) exemption.2 0 In it, "offering" was broadly
construed to include "any attempt to dispose of a security." The
opinion stated that "the [ultimate] determination of what constitutes
a public offering is essentially a question of fact, in which all surrounding circumstances are of moment." It noted that the following
factors "should be considered in determining whether a public offering is involved in a given transaction":
(1) the number of offerees and their relationship
to each other and to the issuer;
(2) the number of units offered;
(3) the size of the offering; and
(4) the manner of offering.
14. H.R. Rnp. No. 85, supra note 13, at 15-16.
15. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Gao. WAsH. L.
REV. 29, 37 (1959). This article is highly recommended to those who enjoy knowing
how things really get done and who appreciate the charm of a well-told personal reminiscence.
16. Id. at 30.
17. Meer, supranote 3, at 504.
18. Id.
19. Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited, 79 H-av. L. Rav. 1340, 1348 (1966).

20. SEC, Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
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While denying that the number of offerees is determinative, the
General Counsel concluded that it was "a primary factor for consideration."' 21 In conjunction with the number of offerees, the opinion mandates inquiry into the offerees' relationship to each other and to the
issuer because "an offering to members of a class who should have
special knowledge of the issuer is less likely to be a public offering."
Further,
[w]here many units are offered in small denominations, or are convertible into small denominations, there is some indication that the
issuer recognizes the possibility, if not the
probability, of a distribu22
tion of the security to the public generally.
The opinion concluded by pointing to additional circumstances
surrounding the offering which would tend to support a determination
of its non-public nature such as the small size of an offering; direct
negotiation between the issuer and purchaser; and the investment
intent of the purchaseras
In 1953 the Supreme Court had its chance to resolve the boundaries
of the private placement exemption. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.
the Court disavowed any numbers test, stating that "the statute would
24
seem to apply to a 'public offering' whether to few or many." It
held that
the applicability of [section 4(2)] should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act. An
offering to those shown to be able to fend
for themselves is a trans25
action "not involving any public offering."
For the exemption to apply, the offerees must be shown "to have access
to the kind of information which registration would disclose." 20 Thus,
21. Patton, The Private Offering: A Simplified Analysis of the Initial Placement,
27 Bus. LAW. 1089, 1097 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Patton]. Commissioner Owens
has stated that the Release placed "[g]reat emphasis" on the number of offerees. Address
by Commissioner Hugh F. Owens, Meeting of District No. 4 of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. in Kansas City, May 1972, in [1972] BNA, Sac. REG. & L. REP.
No. 152, at G-1.
22. SEC, Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
23. The purchaser must not acquire the securities with a view to their distribution
lest he be deemed an underwriter. Securities Act of 1933, § 2 (11), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b) (11)
(1970).
24. 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 127.
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the Ralston Purina decision removed one of the few objective criteria
then extant for reliance upon the exemption: an offering to less than
25 persons.2 7

Instead it emphasized the "needs" and "access" tests. 28

In 1962 the Commission again found it necessary to issue a release
concerning the private offering exemption due to "an increasing tendency to rely upon the exemption for offerings of speculative issues
to unrelated and uninformed persons ....-"29 The release stated that
the availability of the exemption
is essentially a question of fact and necessitates a consideration of all
surrounding circumstances, including such factors as the relationship
between the offerees and the issuer, the nature, scope, size, type and
manner of the offering. °
The Commission attempted to lay the numbers test to rest by stating
that
the number of persons to whom the offering is extended is relevant
only to the question of whether they have the requisite association
with and knowledge of the issuer which make the exemption available. 31
The Release also commented on a third important criterion:
whether the securities offered have come to rest in the hands of the
initial informed group or
whether the purchasers are merely conduits
32
for a wider distribution
Having arrived at a modus vivendi with the section 4 (2) exemption through the application of three imprecise standards: needs,
access and investment intent, the securities bar was tossed from a
raging ocean into a whirlpool by the Commission's brief on appeal 33
in SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. 34 The Commission's brief argued

that
the issuer must affirmatively demonstrate by explicit, exact evidence
27. See 2 S.GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
(1972) [hereinafter cited as GOLDBERG].

AND RESTRICTED SECURITIES

§ 2.3 (c)

28. Patton, supra note 21, at 1094.
29. SEC, Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).

30. Id.
31. Id. Note, however, that certain commentators indicate the still persistent tendency to rely on the "magic twenty-five." 2 GOLDBERG § 2.3 (e).
32. SEC, Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
33.. [1971] BNA, SEC. REG. &L. REP. No. 127, at A-17.
34. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
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that each person to whom unregistered securities were offered was
able to "fend" for himself-in other words, that each offeree had a
relationship to the company tantamount to that of an "insider" in
terms of his ability to know, to understand, and to verify for himself
all of the relevant facts about the company and its securities.33

As if this criterion were not stringent enough, the Commission
further argued that if an offeree seeks advice of counsel, it is suggestive
of his inability to fend for himself and implies that he did not have
sufficient access even if given an offering circular by the offeror.30
Both a Commissioner and the Director of the Division of Corporation
Finance have suggested that the language of the Commission's appellate brief in Continental Tobacco may have been too broad, 37 and
numerous law review articles have appeared attempting to define the
tests applicable to a determination of the availability of the section
38
4 (2) exemption.
II. THE PRESENT

It is against this background of uncertainty that the Commission
proposed Rule 146.
A. Proposed Rule 146
The release accompanying the proposed rule states that
a rule creating greater certainty in the application of the Section
35. [1971] BNA, SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 127, at A-18.
36. Garrett, The State of the Law Outside Rule 146, in PLI, THE 140 SERIES 132
(A. Levenson & W. Sommer eds. 1973). The author is now Chairman of the Commission. He noted that the Commission's arguments "caused some alarm." Id.
37. Remarks by Alan B. Levenson, Director of Corporation Finance, PLI Seminar,
The 140 Series, San Francisco, Cal., June 29, 1973; Address by Commissioner Owens,
in [1972] BNA, SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 152, at G-2. Commissioner Owens stated that
his
interpretation of the Commission's position in this case is that (1) the offerees
must be shown to have access to material information concerning the issuer
and (2) the access criteria cannot be met by merely providing, gratuitously, a
promotional prospectus purporting to afford instant access and by having each
offeree and purchaser sign a letter saying he has received and read such document. Based upon the facts in this case, I do not believe the Commission
meant to say or should have been saying anything more than this.
Id.
38. See, e.g., Patton, supra note 21; Harrison, Thirty-Eight Years Without Definition-The Private Offering Exemption, 27 ARE:. L. REv. 417 (1971); Note, Reforming
the Initial Sale Requirements of the Private Placement Exemption, 86 HARv. L. REv.
403 (1972).
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4(2) exemption would be in the public interest for two reasons; first
to provide objective standards upon which responsible businessmen
[and attorneys 39] may rely and also to deter reliance on that section for
offerings of securities to persons who are unable to fend for themselves
in terms of obtaining information about the issuer and of assuming the
40
risk of investment.

The proposed rule "mark[s] a striking departure from existing ad41
ministrative and judicial interpretations."
Proposed Rule 146 relates only to private offerings of securities
by issuers and not to their subsequent resale. 42 Offers or sales of an
insurer's securities shall be deemed not to involve a public offering
"if all the conditions of the Rule are met." 43 Essentially, the conditions of the proposed rule concern limitations on the manner of offering, the nature of the offerees, the access of offerees to information
39. Remarks by Alan B. Levenson, supra note 37. See Address by Chairman William

J. Casey before the PLI Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Aug. 15,

1972, in [1972] BNA, Smc. REG. & L. REP. No. 165, at F-1. Commissioner Phillip A.
Loomis, Jr. has noted that the proposed rule is an attempt to codify "fairly established
good practice" and "not to open the gates" to real promotions. Remarks by Commissioner Loomis, PLI Seminar, The 140 Series, San Francisco, Cal., June 29, 1973.
40. Release No. 5336, supra note 4.
41. Goldberg, New SEC Rule 146: An Analysis, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1972, at 104.

42. Id.
section 4(2)
that section
requirement

Mr. Levenson has remarked, supra note 38, that his "personal view" is that
is not available for "private resales of private placements." He believes
4(11, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970), which exempts from the registration
"transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer"

is available for such resales. He noted, however, that such private resales of private
placements should be done in such a way as not to disturb the original private offering
exemption. He conjectured that such resales are made pursuant to a "section 4 (1-V2)"
exemption. Nonprivate resales can be made in accordance with SEC Rule 144, 17
C.F.R. § 230.144 (1973). One comment submitted regarding proposed Rule 146 has
stated that the
commission consider expanding the Rule to clarify, on a nonexclusive basis, the
permissible circumstances of [such] private sales by controlling persons and others
who have acquired "restricted securities" as that term is defined in Rule 144.
Letter from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher to SEC, Jan. 17, 1973.
Another letter argues that the proposed rule be expanded to include so-called
"underwritten private placements" wherein the investment banker privately purchases
securities for resales in private offerings. Letter from Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander
& Mitchell to SEC, Jan 22, 1973.
A major broker-dealer suggests that the proposed rule provide an exemption from
registration for transactions executed in the "secondary market" for privately placed
nonconvertible corporate bonds with an original maturity in excess of one year. Letter
from Salomon Brothers to SEC, Jan. 26, 1973. The Subcommittee on Private Offerings
of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association has
commented that secondary private offerings should be permissible under SEC Rule 146
subject to certain limitations. Letter from George M. Duff, Jr., Chairman, to SEC, Jan.
26, 1973.
43. Release No. 5336, supra note 4.
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about the issuer" and limitations on the number of purchasers and on
the disposition of securities sold pursuant to the proposed rule.
Although Chairman Casey, prior to the formulation of the proposed rule, had stated that it was to be "strongly non-exclusive,"Ia
the Commission's release states that
persons may claim a Section 4(2) exemption without complying with
the proposed Rule if they satisfy the criteria set forth in relevant administrative and judicial interpretations of Section 4(2) in effect at
46
the time of the transaction.
Experience teaches that in practice non-exclusivity of Commission

rules is merely a philosophical notion. For instance, Rule 144 (concerning resales of securities acquired prior to its effective date) is
also non-exclusive. 47 Nevertheless, persons who effect sales outside of
Rule 144 "have a substantial burden of proof" to establish that the
exemption from registration was available, and brokers who partici-

pate in such transactions "do so at their risk. ' 48 One practitioner has
noted that it would be difficult to establish that the private offering
exemption was available outside the proposed rule, 40 because a court
44. Chairman Casey had indicated prior to the release for comment of the proposed rule, that it would require a "contractual commitment to provide continued access to information about the issuer." Address, supra note 39. The rule, as proposed,
contains no such provision, and is probably based upon the realization of the burden a
requirement of that nature would place upon issuers who already are required to make
public disclosure of material information. For example, the "Timely Disclosure Policy of
the American Stock Exchange" that states:
A listed Company is required to make prompt public disclosure of any material
development in its affairs and operations, whether favorable or unfavorable,
which might significantly affect the market for its securities or influence investment decisions.
AmERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COiPANY-GUmE § 401 (1968). SEC Rule 15c2-11, 17
C.F.R. 240.15c2-11 (1973) prohibits a broker-dealer from making a market in a
security unless it possesses certain specific information concerning the issuer. Therefore
the issuer must make ongoing public disclosure if it wishes its securities to be traded.
See note 72 infra.
45. Address by Chairman Casey, supra note 39.
46. Release No. 5336. As one comment notes:
In practical effect, Rule 146 will become exclusive, unless the Commission
is willing to interpret existing law to repudiate some of the factors set forth
in its Continental Tobacco brief which, unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit adopted
almost entirely.
Letter from Wolf, Block, Schorr Solis-Cohen to SEC, Jan. 23, 1973.
47. SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
48. Id. The author has also noted the tendency of persons to act within the
provisions of rules which are merely proposed, such as Proposed Rule 13e-2.
49. Remarks by Arthur Fleischer, Jr., PLI Seminar, The 140 Series, San Francisco,
Cal., June 28, 1973.
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would be reluctant to determine the criteria "in relevant judicial
decisions" 50 in light of the "Commission's view" that the basic criteria
for the exemption are "access to information that registration would
disclose and the ability of offerees to be able to fend for themselves
so as not to need the protections afforded by registration." 51
B. Conditionsof ProposedRule 146
Paragraph (b) of the proposed rule requires that all of the conditions contained in the proposed rule must be met in order for a
transaction effected thereunder to qualify for the exemption from
registration. The rule as proposed has six basic considerations:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

limitations on the manner of offering;
nature of offerees;
access to information;
limitation on the number of purchasers;
limits on disposition; and
reports of sales.

52
1. Manner of Offering. No "general advertising" is permitted.
Paragraph (c) of the proposed rule requires that offers and sales be
made only in negotiated transactions, defined in paragraph (a) (3)
to be

transaction[s] in which securities are offered and the terms and
arrangements relating to any sale of securities are arrived at through
50. Release No. 5336, supra note 4.
51. Id.
52. Proposed SEC Rule 146(c) (2) defines "general advertising" as including, but
not limited to
(A) [a]ny advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in
any newspaper magazine or similar medium;
(B) [a]ny radio or television broadcast;
(C) [a]ny seminar or promotional meeting; and
(D) [a]ny letter, circular, notice or other written communication sent, given or
communicated to persons otherwise than in connection with a negotiated
transaction.
One letter of comment suggests that this provision except the delivery of an offering
circular. Letter from O'Melveny & Myers to SEC, Jan. 26, 1972.
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direct communication between the issuer or any person5" 54acting on
its behalf and the purchaser or his investment representative.
The requirement of "direct communication" may preclude many
private offerings to groups of institutional purchasers when the "lead"
institution "carries the ball" for the others in negotiating the purchase. 55 Such a result would be peculiarly counterproductive in view
of the original purpose of section 4 (2) of exempting from registration sales to institutional investors. 56
2. Nature of Offerees. This condition of the proposed rule is
one of the most troublesome. Paragraph (d) requires, for the offering
to be exempt from registration, that
53. Paragraph (a) (1) of the proposed rule defines the term "person" to include
any relatives or spouse who have the "same home" as the person to whom securities are
offered or sold in a transaction effected in reliance on the rule; any trust or estate in
which such person, relative or spouse "collectively own all of the beneficial interest";
and any corporation or other organization in which such person, spouse or relative arc
the "beneficial owners collectively of all of each class of equity securities or of all the
equity interest." However, the definition specifically excludes
any corporation, partnership, business association or other unincorporated
entity organized for the specific purpose of the acquisition of the securities
offered in the transaction.
Every beneficial owner of such entity is deemed a separate entity for the purpose of the
proposed rule. Release No. 5336, supra note 4.
54. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
55. See remarks by Arthur Fleischer, Jr., supra note 49; letter from Cravath,
Swaine & Moore to SEC, Jan. 29, 1973. One letter urges that
the requirement of face-to-face communication is unduly narrow and renders
the Rule unavailable for the typical multi-bank loan or institutional private
placements.
Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to SEC, Jan. 26, 1973. Mr. Levenson has stated that
the Commission probably should revise the proposed rule to recognize such a situation.
Remarks by Mr. Levenson, supranote 37.
The requirement of direct communication may similarly cause problems when a
closely-held corporation is acquired. Typically in such situations the majority shareholder will negotiate the transaction on his own behalf as well as for the minority
shareholders. In such instances, Mr. Levenson has suggested that the majority shareholder may be deemed to be the investment representative of the minority shareholders
if: (1) his experience is such that he can evaluate the information provided; (2) he
is selected to so act by the other shareholders; and (3) he discloses any consideration he
receives which is different from that received by the other shareholders. Id. See text
accompanying note 71 infra. One letter of comment suggests that proposed Rule 146
be expanded to cover acquisitions of closely-held corporations particularly since Rule 133
has been rescinded. Letter from Committee on Securities Regulation of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York to SEC, Jan. 25, 1973. Commissioner Loomis has
remarked that proposed Rule 146 was not really drafted with business combinations in
mind and if it is to apply to such transactions it must be redrafted. Remarks by Commission Loomis, supra note 39.
56. See text accompanying note 15 supra. Former Chairman Cohen has remarked
that the Commission may change this provision before the rule is adopted. Remarks
by Manuel F. Cohen, PLI Seminar, The 140 Series, San Francisco, Cal., June 29, 1973.
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[t]he issuer and any person acting on its behalf ... have reasonable
grounds to believe prior to making an offer:
(1) that either the offeree or his investment representative has such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he 5is7
capable of utilizing the information referred to in paragraph (e)
....to evaluate the risks of the prospective investment and of making
an informed investment decision; and
(2) that the offeree is a person who is able to bear the economic risks
of the investment.
This is the "needs" test applied to all offerees.
Professor Loss has commented that the application of paragraph
(d) should be limited merely to buyers and not apply to all offerees: 5s
"Surely, after all the turmoil, we don't want to envisage a section
12 (1) [civil] action turning on the sterile questions of the sophistication and access of some isolated offeree who in fact never bought [the
proffered stock] . . ...59 The staff of the Commission has answered
that although it has been reasonably suggested that the proposed rule
be directed towards purchasers and not offerees, the Commission must
heed a "Supreme Court decision" (viz. Ralston Purina)when drafting
60
an administrative rule.
Paragraph (d) of the proposed rule requires that prior to making
the offer the issuer must determine whether the offeree or his investment representative is sophisticated and can bear the economic risks
of the investment. This requirement imposes a difficult problem upon
the offeror: although the release accompanying the proposed rule states
that mere inquiry into the potential offeree's ability to bear the eco57. See text accompanying note 70 infra.
58. Letter from Louis Loss to SEC, Jan. 12, 1973. The Professor believes that
the application of paragraphs "(d) and (e) [of the proposed rule] to every offeree is
inconsistent with a test in terms of" the number of buyers. Id. The same point is
made in the comment letter from Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood to SEC,
Jan. 29, 1973. However, the comment letter from the Subcommittee on Private Offerings
of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association
states:
[W]e recognize that it is the opinion of the [SEC] . . . that the decision of the
Supreme Court in . . . [Ralston Purina] establishes principles which cannot be
overruled by regulation of the Commission, and that in the absence of the
Ralston Purina case it might have been possible to place greater emphasis on
such factors as the number of purchasers and the identity of the class. Although
the proposed rule might be criticized as being merely a restatement of the present
state of the law, on reflection it is difficult to come up with a better approach.
Letter from George M. Duff, Jr., supra note 42 (citation omitted).
59. Letter from Louis Loss, supra note 58.
60. Remarks by Alan Levenson, supranote 37.
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nomic risk of the investment does not constitute an offer, 61 potential
offerees will probably not provide sufficient information to the issuer
without any discussion of the proposed investment-a "chicken and
egg" problem according to one comment. 2 Another comment on the
proposed rule has suggested a practical middle ground between the
Commission's concern with Ralston Purinaand the very real difficulty
of compliance with this requirement. The comment suggests that
the issuer should be permitted to withdraw the offer to a particular
offeree if the offeree is determined not0 3to be sophisticated and [thus]
not have the entire transaction affected.
It has been suggested that the ability to bear the economic burden
of being "locked-in" for a period of years is a different yardstick from
"suitability."' 4 Although securities lawyers may perceive the distinction, the courts may not, and issuers will therefore run the risk of a
private offering being rescinded because the investment was not "suitable" for one of the offerees. One commentator has urged that because
of the "very considerable difficulty in defining the term 'able to bear
the economic risks,'" the Commission "reconsider the need" for this
test in view of the requirement that an offeree be able to fend for
himself. 65 Another comment notes that since section 4 (2) provides
an exemption from the registration requirement, "whether a buyer
is able to bear the economic risks of an investment is not a matter
which is addressed by the registration process."0' 6 This comment suggests that clause (2) of paragraph (d) might well, therefore, be deleted entirely.
The second requirement imposed by paragraph (d) of the pro61. Release No. 5336, supranote 4.

62. Letter from Securities Law Committee of the Chicago Bar Association to
SEC, Jan. 26, 1973.
63. Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore to SEC, Jan. 29, 1973.
64. Remarks of Arthur Fleischer, Jr., supra note 49. Chairman Casey proposed
a suitability test offering assurance that the buyer is a type of person who does
not need the protection of registration based on his financial circumstances
and his ability or that of his representative to comprehend the deal.
Address by Chairman Casey, supranote 39.
65. Letter from George M. Duff, Jr., supra note 42. Another comment suggests the
substitution of some objective standard such as gross income for tax purposcs
or net assets or the creation of a presumption in the case of a person meeting
such an objective standard.
Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 55.
66. Letter from Committee on Securities Regulation of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, supra note 55.
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posed rule is that the issuer and any person acting on its behalf have
reasonable grounds to believe, prior to making an offer, that either
the offeree or his investment representative "has such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters" that he has the capacity
to evaluate the risks of the investment. Such language is less than
clear and fails "to substitute objective standards for the vague, subjective tests heretofore applied in section 4 (2) .-67 Although it is apparent that both the courts and the Commission need some discretion
in this area, and also that unsophisticated investors should not be
offered restricted securities, the requirement of subparagraph (d) (1)
does nothing "more than summarize the general language found in
the pertinent cases which is the source of the present confusion."68s
The proposed rule attempts to add a measure of objectivity by
introducing the concept of the "investment representative." The sophistication requirement of the proposed rule will be satisfied if the
investment representative, pursuant to paragraph (2) (A), has "such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he
is capable of evaluating the risks of a prospective investment." 69
Nevertheless, even this concept is imprecise. The Commission has
not stated that certain classes would, prima facie, qualify as invest67. Letter from Securities Law Committee of the Chicago Bar Association, supra
note 62.
68. Id. In fact one comment refers to the "suitability" requiremerts in paragraph (d) of the proposed rule. Letter from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, supra note 42.
See also Schneider & Manko, Rule 145-PartII, 6 SEC. REG. Rav. 991 (1973), which
refers to paragraph (d) as the "suitability test."
69. Paragraph (a) (2) defines "investment representative" to include any person
who, in addition to the quoted subparagraph (A), also
(B) has been duly authorized by the person for whose account securities are
to be purchased to act as agent for such person in effecting such purchase; and
(C) is independent of the issuer and is not acting on behalf of the issuer
and is not acting on behalf of the issues in connection with the transaction.
One comment has noted that clause (B), quoted above, is "unduly restrictive" by
requiring that the investment representative be authorized to act as "agent" for the
offeree. It should be sufficient, the commentator argues, "[i]f the purchaser is relying
upon the investment representative as an investment adviser or consultant." Letter
from Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 55. The requirement of clause (C), quoted
above, that the investment representative be "independent of the issuer" may be particularly burdensome. When the issuer approaches a broker-dealer with a proposed
private offering, it would appear that the broker-dealer could not discuss the investment with its clients since to do so might constitute "acting on behalf of the issuer in
connection with the transaction." A literal reading of clause (C) would, therefore, require, that another broker-dealer be "interpositioned" in the transaction, probably to
the detriment of the issuer and investors because of the increased costs of the offering.
For x discussion of the investment representative in the context of the acquisition of a
closely-held corporation, see note 55 supra.
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ment representatives. For example, it could have provided that brokerdealers registered under the 1934 Act, registered investment advisers,
trust companies, banks, etc., would be deemed to fulfill the requirements of paragraph (2) (A) of the proposed rule, thus affording
a considerably greater degree of certainty.
3. Access to Information. Paragraph (e) of the proposed rule
requires that each offeree or his investment representative have during
the course of the negotiated transaction
(1) . . .the same kind of information that the Act would make

available in the form of a registration statement, to the extent such
information is available, or have access to such information; and

(2) . . .access to any additional information necessary to verify the

accuracy of such information.
The proposed rule adopts a disjunctive approach, requiring either
the same type of information as would appear in a registration
statement or access to such information. The Director of the Division
of Corporation Finance has noted that the proposed rule probably
should distinguish between reporting and non-reporting companies. 70
A reporting company should, according to his suggestion, provide copies
of filings it has made with the Commission as well as information concerning the nature of the securities being offered, its use of the proceeds,
and any material changes, since its last filing. Non-reporting companies
might use as a standard the information required in a Regulation A
offering or information similar to the description of source of receipts
and disbursements as required in form S-2.
Nevertheless, the rule as proposed might put a substantial burden
on issuers making a private offering. It would require them to "develop a disclosure document equivalent to a going public prospectus .... -71 Alternatively, the issuer might have to open its books
and records to every offeree to provide it "access to such information."
This would probably cause disruption of the issuer's business, but
would be required if the issuer is to avoid the substantial expense of
preparing a disclosure document akin to a prospectus. It has been
70. Remarks of Alan Levenson, supranote 37.
71. Letter from George M. Duff, Jr., supra note 42. It should be noted that paragraph (e) (1) requires that information be provided "to the extent such information
is available." As pointed out by one comment, information may be available "in the
sense that weeks of work in assembling and analyzing raw data can enable the company to meet the registration statement requirements." Letter from Wolf, Block, Schorr
Solis-Cohen, supra note 46.
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suggested that the "Commission substitute for the present language
of clause (1), a listing of the information called for by items (1)
through (13) of Rule 15c2-1 1- (a) under the Exchange Act." 72 In any
event, it is clear that a more limited disclosure requirement would be
more appropriate. The alternative requirement of "access to such information" should be amended so as to be satisfied by activities such
as discussions with the issuer's officers and inspection of its facilities.
Clause (2) of paragraph (e) insures that the offeree or his investment representative have access to any additional information
necessary to verify the accuracy of such information. Would this require the issuer to open its records, including its ledger, correspondence
files, etc., to inspection by the offeree? If so, most issuers would
probably find the requirement unduly burdensome. Also, one comment notes that "[i]t is unclear whether the rule is available where
some of the information furnished is not subject to verification."7 3
Furthermore, any "access-to-information" requirements which are
finally adopted clearly endure "only so long as an offeree continues
as a potential purchaser." 74
72. Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 55. Rule 15c2-11 prohibits a
broker-dealer from publishing a quotation for a security unless he has the following
information:
(1) the exact name of the issuer;
(2) the address of the issuer's principal office;
(3) the issuer's state of incorporation;
(4) the title and class of the security;
(5) the par or stated value of the security;
(6) the number of shares or total amount of the securities outstanding as of
the end of its most recent fiscal year;
(7) the name and address of the transfer agent;
(8) the nature of the issuer's business;
(9) the nature of products or services offered by the issuer;
(10) the nature and extent of the issuer's facilities;
(11) the name of the issuer's chief executive officer and directors;
(12) the issuer's most recent balance sheet and profit and loss and retained
earnings statement;
(13) similar financial information for such part of the two preceding fiscal
years as the issuer or its predecessor has been in existence;
(14) whether the broker or dealer or any associated persons is affiliated,
directly or indirectly with the issuer;
(15) whether the quotation is being published on behalf of any other broker
or dealer and, if so, its name; and,
(16) whether the quotation is being published directly or indirectly on behalf
of the issuer or affiliate thereof.
SEC Rule 15c2-11, 17 C.F.R. 240, 15c2-11 (1973).
73. Letter from Securities Law Committee of the Chicago Bar Association, supra
note 62.
74. See Letter from Committee on Securities Regulation of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, supranote 55.
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The access-to-information requirement is certainly adaptable to
standards more objective than those contained in the proposed rule.
The Commission should draft a form for a disclosure document which,
if provided by the issuer, would satisfy the access requirement.
4. Limitation on the Number of Purchasers. Paragraph (f) of
the proposed rule prohibits sales, in private offerings made pursuant
to the rule or "otherwise in reliance on Section 4 (2)," to more than
35 persons in any consecutive 12-month period. However, any
person who purchases securities from the issuer "for cash in an amount
not less than $250,000" is not included in determining the number
of such purchasers. It should also be noted that spouses and relatives
living in the same home as the purchaser, as well as trusts, estates or
corporations in which the purchaser (or spouse or other relative within the same home) owns all of the beneficial interest, are treated for
the purposes of the proposed rule, as the same person.
However, the synopsis of the provisions of the proposed rule
issued by the Commission states that
the rule would treat clients of an investment advisor as separate
persons in determining the number of persons to whom securities
may be sold, regardless of the amount of discretion given to the invest76
ment advisor to act on behalf of the client in purchasing securities.
It is apparent that this statement ought to be incorporated in paragraph
(a) of the proposed rule itself, since a literal reading of that paragraph does not put the reader on notice of the Commission's interpretation. This position has drawn some of the most vociferous comment
urging that persons
who are represented by the same trustee or investment advisor who
has sole discretion to make the investment for them to be treated as
one person for the purpose of applying the 35 person limitation and
the $250,000 purchase exclusion. 76
75. Release No. 5336, supra note 4.
76. Letter from Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, supra note 58. See

also Letter from Sullivan & Worcester to SEC, Jan. 26, 1973. Another comment reminded the Commission that
[flor over 25 years, at least since the letter, dated March 5, 1946, from Baldwin
B. Bane, Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, to Bankers Trust
Company, a copy of which is enclosed, the Commission has accepted the position and lawyers have advised that when several purchases are made pursuant
to an investment decision by a trustee, agent, investment advisor or other
person with sole discretion to make such purchases and the decision as to all
purchases is made by the same person or group of persons who customarily
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Paragraph (f) applies the 35 purchaser test to private offerings
of "securities of the issuer" without regard to class, debt or equity.
The Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, noting that
this failure to distinguish among the types of securities being offered
presents problems, would "strongly support a revision" of the paragraph to read "securities of the same or similar class of the issuer,"
77
thereby differentiating between offerings of debt and equity securities.
With respect to paragraph (f), other comments submitted to the
Commission recommend that the $250,000 level be reduced to $100,000
which has been suggested "a more reasonable figure. 1 78 Also, the requirement that purchases in excess of $250,000 be in cash in order that
they be excluded from the calculation should be expanded to include
purchases made for other valuable consideration.7 9 Finally, there is
an indication that in redrafting proposed Rule 146 the Commission
will substitute a six-month period for the now proposed 12-month
period. 0
Paragraph (b) requires that all conditions of the proposed rule
must be met for the transaction to be deemed within the purview of
section 4(2). This presents the difficult, and as yet unanswered,
question of how to treat a series of private offerings within a 12-month
period pursuant to the proposed rule which, in total, involve more
than 85 purchasers. Would only the last placements be affected, or
would all the offerings be invalid under, the theory of integration?
Varied solutions to this dilemma have been offered, including: putting
pass on such matters so that the decision as to all purchases can be said to

be the result of one study and conclusion, the purchases should be treated as a
purchase by one person.
Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 55.
77. Remarks by Alan Levenson, supra note 37.
78. Letter from Shearman & Sterling to SEC, Jan. 29, 1973. See also Letter from
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, supra note 42; Letter from Securities Law Committee of
the Chicago Bar Association, supra note 62; Letter from the Committee on Securities
Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 55. It has
also been suggested that institutional purchasers should be excluded from the $250,000
provision, if not from the entire proposed rule. Letter from George M. Duff, Jr., supra
note 42.
79. Letter from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, supra note 42. Other comments have
suggested that the $250,000 exclusion should, in addition to cash purchases, include a
"roll over" of existing debt; a determination based upon total investment of securities
purchased incrementally. Letter from Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood,
supra note 58.
80. Alan Levenson has stated that he would support a period of less than twelve
months or "perhaps six months would be an appropriate period." Remarks by Alan
Levenson, supra note 37.
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the 35 purchaser limit on each offering only;8 ' allowing purchasers
to rely on the issuer's representation that it had not in the preceding
12 months and would not in the succeeding period sell to more than
35 purchasers; 8 2 allowing a prior offering made in compliance with
the provisions of the proposed rule to stand;83 integrating only those
offerings in which "the use of proceeds will be applied to the same
' s4
specific project or to a series of related projects.
5. Limits on Disposition. Paragraph (g) of the proposed rule requires that the issuer and any person acting on its behalf shall, "after
reasonable inquiry, not be aware of circumstances indicating" that purchasers are underwriters, and shall "exercise reasonable care to assure
that a deferred distribution" will not occur. "Reasonable care" must
include, but is not limited to, legending the certificates; placing stoptransfer instructions; and, having the purchaser sign an agreement that
he will not resell without registration or other compliance with the
Act and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Subparagraph (2) makes the use of legends, stop-transfer instructions and restrictive agreements mandatory. Subparagraph (2) indicates that "reasonable care" is "not necessarily limited to" these enumerated steps. This creates some ambiguity which is contrary to the
Commission's goal of objectivity. Certainly, legending certificates,
placing stop-transfer instructions and obtaining investment agreements
should be sufficient to satisfy the duty of "reasonable care." It should
be noted that persons acquiring securities pursuant to the provisions
of proposed Rule 146 would be able to dispose of them after the twoyear holding period provided by Rule 144.85
6. Reports of Sales. Paragraph (h) requires the issuer to file a
report of sale on Form 146 with the Commission within 45 days after
the close of any quarter of its fiscal year during which sales of securities
are effected in reliance on the proposed rule. This provision exempts
from the reporting requirement sales by an issuer which do not exceed
$50,000, within the preceding 12 months. The proposed rule also pro81. Letter from Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, supra note 58.
82. Id.
83. Letter from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, supra note 42. This comment letter also
suggests that sales by purchasers
as would not constitute them "underwriters" should not have the effect of increasing the number of persons to whom the issuer is regarded as selling
securities in private transactions for purposes of paragraph (f) of the Rule.
84. Id. Letter from O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 52.

85. See note 47 supra.
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vides that the filing requirements shall be deemed satisfied if the issuer
is subject "to the periodic reporting requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934" and has filed a report thereunder on Form
10-K or Form I0-Q.
It has been suggested to the Commission that the addition of this
new filing requirement serves no substantial purpose. 86 It has also been
urged that inadvertent failure to file a report of a sale made pursuant
to the proposed rule should not make the rule "otherwise unavailable
to an issuer," but should merely permit the Commission, in its discretion, to utilize its "general enforcement powers" to determine that
the Rule might be unavailable in a given situation."81

III. THE

FUTURE

In a 1966 law review article which has been hailed as "monumental,"88s Milton H. Cohen suggested that
[i]n a coordinated disclosure law and its administration primary emphasis should shift from the 1933 Act's sporadic, ad hoc disclosures to
the 1934 Act's continuous disclosure system. It follows that "1933 Act"
concepts should have altogether different application to issuers that
are fully subject to the continuous disclosure system ("continuous
registrants") and to issuers that are not.89

Mr. Cohen's basic thesis was the proposal that a "coordinated disclosure
law" be adopted. It was this article which provided the impetus for
the recent Tentative Draft No. 1 of the American Law Institute's
Federal Securities Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) .0
The most striking change present in the Code with respect to
the subject of this article is the elimination of the registration of
securities offerings.
[I]nstead, a company will register as such when it first reaches
$1,000,000 in assets and 300 record holders of all its securities86. Letter from George M. Duff, Jr., supra note 42.
87. Letter from O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 52. See also Letter of Securities
Law Committee of the Chicago Bar Association, supra note 62.
88. Remarks by Commmissioner Loomis, supra note 39.
89. Cohen, supra note 19, at 1406.
90. ALI FED. SEc. CODE, supra note 5. See Loss, supra note 7; Loss & Blackstone,
Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 Bus. LAW. 381, 383 (1973).
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rather than 500 holders of a class of equity securities as at presentor when the first "distribution" is made of any of its securities.0'
The Code substitutes the word "distribution" for the term "public
offering. 92s Section 227 of the Code defines "distribution" as "an
offering other than a limited offering or a trading transaction."9 8 A
"limited offering" is
one in which the following conditions are satisfied: (A) the initial
buyers of the securities are institutional investors and not more than
94
thirty-five other persons ....
Section 242 of the Code defines "institutional investor" as
(a) a bank, insurance company, or registered investment company,
or a parent of any such person, except to the extent that the Commission provides otherwise by rule with respect to any such class of
persons on the basis of such factors as financial sophistication, net
worth, and the amount of assets under investment management, or
(b) any other person of a class that the Commission designates by
rule on the basis of such factors. 95
It should be clearly noted that Section 227 of the Code defines "limited
offering," to permit an unlimited number of institutional investors
as initial purchasers and no more than 35 additional persons. The
Code does not seek to impose limitations on the number of offerees.
Comment 2 (b) to Section 227 of the Code states that
[i]n the past, insofar as numbers are relevant at all in determining
the existence of a "public offering," the emphasis has always been
on the number of offerees. This draft goes over to the number of
buyers, leaving the number of offerees unlimited, for two reasons:
because the breadth of the definition of "offer" makes it difficult
to count offerees, and because it is difficult to see how an offeree who
does not buy is hurt.98
The Code would permit resales by a purchaser in limited offerings.9 7 However, it prohibts an offeror or reseller in a limited offering
91. ALI FED. SEC. CODE, supra note 5, at XVIII (emphasis in original).
92. Loss & Blackstone, supra note 90.

93. ALI

FED. SEC. CODE

§ 227(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).

94. Id. § 227(b).
95. Id. § 242.
96. Id. § 227, Comment 2.
97. Id. Section 227(b) (1) (c) requires that the original offering and any resales
comply with any rules adopted under section 227 (b) (4) which provides that
[t]he Commission may require by rule (A) that the seller, as well as any

86
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to engage in "general advertising." 98 The Code also seeks to solve the
problem of integration by providing that during three years after the
last sale to any of the initial buyers in a limited offering, there may not
be more than 35 "buyer-owners at any one time (apart from institutional investors) ."99 If the issuer is a "one-year registrant" there may
be no more than 35 buyer-owners (aside from institutional investors)
for one year from the last sale to any of the original buyers. 100 A "oneyear registrant" is defined in Section 270 of the Code and refers to a
corporation which has been continuously registered under the Code
for a period of one year.' 0 '
The Code also deals with "integration" by providing criteria for
02
determining whether one or more limited offerings have occurred.
Section 267 (a) provides that
(1) offers of securities of different classes are separate offerings, and
(2) offers of securities of the same class (whether by or for the account
or benefit of the issuer or any other person) are separate offerings
only if they are substantially distinct on the basis of such factors as
the manner, time, or purpose of the offerings, the offering price, or
03
the kind of consideration'
The Code has been criticized "on the ground that it sacrifices too
much investor protection.' 0 4 It has been stated that "it is unwise to
permit investor protection in a limited offering to depend almost
totally upon the use of antifraud remedies as a spur to disclosure."' 0 5
This comment overlooks the basic concept of the Code that companies
rather than securities be registered. Such registration is contemplated
by the Code to be on a continuous basis and to be expanded beyond
the scope currently required by the 1934 Act. Additionally, the Code
reseller within the one-year or three-year period (as the case may be) specified in paragraphs (1) and (2), obtain an appropriate written undertaking from
his buyer in an offering that purports to be a limited offering, (B) that a
security that is the subject of a limited offering contain an appropriate restriction on transferability, and (C) that any transfer agent be given an appropriate stop-transfer notice, in each case designed to avoid a distribution.

Id.

98. Id. §502(b).
99. Id. § 270.
100. Id. § 227(a) (2).
101. Id. § 270. See also id.§§ 288, 401-02.
102. Id. § 267(a).
103. Id.
104. Note, supra note 38, at 420.
105. Id.
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provides for the filing of an "offering statement" when a distribution
is made. 10 Therefore, additional disclosures will be required at the
time a special selling effort is involved in distribution. Nevertheless,
the Code recognizes the need for certainty with respect to a limited
offering and perceives that sufficient remedies under the antifraud
provisions are present to assure investor protection. Certainly, institutional investors, as defined in Section 242 of the Code, are able to
"fend" for themselves. The Code's restriction of the "limited offering"
exemption to transactions which involve no more than 35 buyerowners for a reasonable period of time assures that massive public
offerings will not occur without full disclosure of a registration statement.
CONCLUSION

The state of the law with respect to the exemption from registration contained in section 4 (2) is generally conceded to be in great
need of improvement. Proposed Rule 146 constitutes a sincere effort
by the Commission to bring some objective standards to this otherwise subjective area of the law. The proposed rule is, at best, a temporary solution because it is rooted in the uncertainty inherent in the
Securities Act of 1933. The only long term solution to fulfilling the
needs of issuers who must obtain financing through private offerings
is adoption of a new unified federal securities code. Such legislation
should recognize, as does the American Law Institute Tentative Draft
No. 1, that the trading markets are entitled to as full a disclosure as
purchasers in a public offering. When such continuous disclosure to
the trading markets is established, protection will be afforded not only
to investors acquiring positions in public offerings, but to all investors
to enable them to make informed judgments. Although the wheels of
progress grind slowly, the time has arrived, if it has not already passed,
for the suggestions made by Mr. Cohen to be codified and enacted.

POSTSCRIPT

On October 10, 1973, subsequent to the preparation of the foregoing article, the Securities and Exchange Commission published a re106. ALI FED. CODE § 501(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
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vised proposed Rule 146107 (hereinafter referred to as revised rule)
which contains several significant changes. This postscript will be devoted to an exposition of the more important revisions that have been
made, and to a tentative analysis of the value of these changes.
A. Definitions
1. Revised Rule 146(a)(1). First, the term of "investment representative" has been dropped in favor of "offeree representative" "to
reflect more precisely the relationship"' 08 between the offeree and its
representative. Unlike the original proposal, an "offeree representative" is not required to be "independent of the issuer." Instead, subparagraph (a) (1) of the revised rule defines "offeree representative"
to be any person who satisfies all of the following conditions:
is not an affiliate, 10 9 associate, or employee of the issuer ...;
has such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters that he is capable of evaluating the risks of the prospective investment;
(iii) is acknowledged by the offeree during the course of the transaction to be his representative in connection with evaluating the
risks of the prospective investment; and
(iv) discloses to the offeree, in writing, any relationship with the
issuer or its affiliates, then existing or mutually understood to be
contemplated or which has existed at any time during the previous two (2) years and any compensation received or to be
received as a result of such relationship." 0
(i)
(ii)

Thus, an offeree must acknowledge "during the course of the
transaction" that the offeree representative acts for it "in connection
107. SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Release No. 5430].
108. Id. at 7.
109. Subparagraph (a) (1) (i) provides that the offeree representative may qualify
if the offeree is:
(a) a spouse, son, daughter, sister, brother, mother or father of such person;
(b) a relative of such person or his spouse, who has the same home as such
person;
(c) any trust or estate in which such person or any of the persons specified in
(a) or (b) collectively own 100 percent of the total beneficial interest
or of which any such person serves as trustee, executor, or in any similar
capacity;
(d) any corporation or other organization in which such person or any of the
persons specified in (a) or (b) are the beneficial owners collectively of
100 percent of the equity securities or interest.
110. Release No. 5430 at 7.
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with evaluating the risks of the prospective investment." Further, the
revised rule requires that the offeree representative disclose in writing
to the offeree any present or contemplated relationships between it
and the issuer, as well as any previous relationships of this type which
may have existed during the preceding two years. The offeree representative must specifically state any compensation received as a result
of any such relationship.
Although the revised rule removes the troublesome requirement
that the offeree's representative be independent of the issuer, it retains
the imprecise standard that the representative be sufficiently knowledgeable and experienced to be "capable of evaluating the risks of the prospective investment." The difficulties which may be encountered in
the uncertain standard adopted in the revised rule can be easily envisioned. For example, if the offeree is represented by counsel who is
not sophisticated in financial matters, the revised rule would apparently
require the issuer to determine if this representative "is capable of
evalauting the risks of the prospective investment." If subsequent to
the sale, it is determined that the lawyer was not "capable," the
exemption from registration provided by the revised rule might be
unavailable; and thus, the entire private offering would violate the
registration requirements of the Act.
2. Revised Rule 146(a) (2). The revised rule eliminates the term
"negotiated transaction" in favor of "direct communication," which
is defined in subparagraph (a) (2) to be the opportunity for the offeree
or its representative to "ask questions of, and receive answers from,
the issuer or any person acting in its behalf concerning the terms and
conditions of the transaction." This change is an acknowledgment
by the Commission that the initial proposal, which included the concept of a "negotiated transaction," might have jeopardized "certain
legitimate prevailing practices, such as where a financial institution
acts as a 'lead purchaser.' """ The requirement of direct communication between the issuer and the offeree or its representative is retained
to permit access to necessary information.
3. Other Definitional Subparagraphs. New definitional subparagraphs have also been added to define "executive officer" and
"issuer." 112 The definition of "person" has been shifted to paragraph
111. Id.
112. Subparagraph

(a) (3)

defines the term "executive officer"

to include the

president, secretary, treasurer and any vice president in charge of a principal business
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(g), which governs the number of purchasers permitted, "because the
definition [of "person"] is for the purpose of that paragraph only.""13
B. Nature of Offerees: Revised Rule 146(d)
Subparagraph (d) of the original proposal required that the issuer,
and any person acting in its behalf, have reasonable grounds to believe
prior to making an offer that: (1) the offeree or its representative was
knowledgeable and experienced enough to both evaluate the risks of
the prospective investment and to make an informed investment decision thereon, and (2) the offeree is able to bear the economic risks
of the investment. Subparagraph (d) of the revised rule requires the
issuer, and any person acting on its behalf, to have reasonable grounds
to believe the aforementioned standards have been fulfilled prior
to making an offer and prior to making a sale. The requirement that
the issuer have reasonable grounds to believe that the offeree is able
to bear the economic risks of the investment is applicable only if an
offeree representative is used. (This requirement would not apply at
all in the case of a business combination.) Subparagraph (d) (3) provides that the rule will be available "notwithstanding the fact that
inquiry subsequent to the offer reveals that the offeree or his offeree
representative did not meet the [aforementioned standards]" and, "if
an offeree representative is selected by the offeree, that the offeree did
not meet the [foregoing] standards . . .provided that no sale to any

such offeree is completed."
C. ProvidingAccess to, and Furnishingof Information:
Revised Rule 146(e)
Subparagraph (e) (3) of the revised rule adds the requirement
that the issuer advise every purchaser, in writing, that it must bear
function, and any other person who performs similar policymaking functions for the
issuer. Subparagraph (a)(4) provides that in addition to the definition of the term
"issuer" in section 2(4) of the Act, when that term is used
in connection with an offering of securities in an organization, such as a
limited partnership, not yet formed [the term "issuer"] shall be deemed to mean
the general partner or promoter of the organization, provided that when such
organization is formed it shall be deemed the issuer; and [iln the case of a
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession shall be deemed to be the issuer in an offering for purposes of a plan of
reorganization or arrangement, if the securities offered are to be issued pursuant
to the plan, whether or not other like securities are offered under the plan in
exchange for securities of, or claims against, the debtor.
113. Release No. 5430 at 8.
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the economic risk of the investment for an indefinite period because
the securities have not been registered. The release accompanying the
revised rule indicates the Commission's belief that a determination of
"ability to bear the economic risk" must be based on the particular
circumstances of each case.114 The Commission states that
[c]ertainly the important considerations are whether the offeree could
afford to hold unregistered securities for an indefinite period, and
whether, at the time of the investment, he could afford a complete
loss.15

As originally proposed, the rule required that offerees and their
representatives be provided with information of the same kind as would
be available in a registration statement, and to have access to additional information necessary to verify its accuracy. As a result of comment on the lack of standards for determining the nature of the information required, the rule has been revised to provide "more explicit standards in this regard."' " 6

Paragraph (e) now requires that the offeree or its representative
have access to the same kind of information as is required by Schedule
A of the Act "to the extent that the issuer possesses such information
or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense .... ." A note
has been added to paragraph (e) to delineate the Commission's concept of "access." It is stated that "access" exists by reason of the offeree's
or its representative's position with respect to the issuer. In other
words, the offeree must have a relationship which enables it to demand
information from the issuer rather than one in which it must wait until
the issuer voluntarily provides such information. The issuer, instead
of merely providing access, may furnish the offeree or its representative
with the specified information during the course of the transaction.
The revised rule also designates the type of information which
must be furnished. For example, an issuer which is subject to the reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 may comply
with the rule by providing offerees with the information contained;
(1) in its most recent annual report required to be filed on Form 10-K
and, (2) in all other documents required to be filed by the reporting
provisions since the end of the issuer's most recent fiscal year. The
issuer must also advise every offeree of the intended use of the sought
114. Id. at 10.
115. Id.
116. Id.

PROPOSED RULE 146

after proceeds, of material adverse changes in its affairs and of the
number and description of the securities being offered. An offering
circular may be utilized by the issuer to provide this additional information.
Non-reporting issuers are required to provide the information
called for by Schedule A of the Securities Act. If certified financial
statements are unavailable, a non-reporting issuer is required to provide the information called for by Regulation A.
D. Business Combinations:Revised Rule 146(f)
Initially, the proposed rule "was intended to cover business combinations." 117 The Commission, however, based upon comments received by it, has revised the rule as it applies to these transactions.
Subparagraph (f) (1) now defines the term "business combination"
to include reclassifications, mergers, consolidations, transfers of assets,
exchanges of securities and other similar business reorganizations.
Subparagraph (f) (2) further defines the term "offeree representative," for the purpose of business combinations, to include any
person who is an "affiliate, director or executive officer of a corporation or other organization being acquired pursuant to a business
combination transaction" and who fulfills the requirements of subparagraph (a) (that he is capable of evaluating the risks of the prospective investment; is acknowledged by the offeree as his representative; and has made the requisite disclosure of any relationships with
the issuer). The revised rule also requires the offeree representative
in the context of a business combination to disclose any arrangements
of terms of the transaction relating to him that are not identical to
those relating to all other security holders of the acquired organization.
Only an affiliate, director, or executive officer of the entity to be
acquired in the business combination is permitted by the revised rule
to solicit shareholders for the purpose of being selected as their representative. Furthermore, the person making this solicitation must be
capable of evaluating the risks of the transaction. The solicitation itself, which must be in writing, is to be limited to naming the issuer
and the parties to the transaction; providing a brief description of
their business; a brief description of the transaction and its anticipated
time of offering; and a disclosure of any terms of any arrangement
with the solicitor which are not identical to those offered to all other
117. Id. at 11.
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security holders. The written solicitation must also contain an undertaking to provide a complete statement of any different terms should
the solicitor be selected as representative. Finally, it is required that
a security holder be given the opportunity to select any other person
as his representative. Should this option be exercised, the security
holder may be reimbursed, by the acquired or acquiring company, for
his representative's reasonable expenses.
The release accompanying the revised rule notes that:
The Commission recognizes that a security holder who [is not
capable of evaluating the risks of the prospective investment] and who
does not select an offeree representative could prevent the use of the
Rule for the business combination. The Commission specifically invites
comments on this aspect of the proposed Rule.1 1

There appears to be no solution to the Commission's dilemma under
the rule as it is presently structured. If the offeree is not possessed of
sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters
to be capable of evaluating the risks of the prospective investment, no
offering should be made to him in the absence of a competent offeree
representative.
E. Number of Purchasers:Revised Rule 146(g)
The rule, as originally proposed, provided that the number of
purchasers of all classes of the issuer's securities during any 12-month
period must be limited to 35 persons. The revised rule would permit
as many as 35 purchasers of each class of the issuer's securities in the
same period. 19 Unfortunately, the Commission persists in its belief
that it is necessary to count each client of an individual investment advisor separately.
Accordingly, offers or sales to any person, including an investment
118. Id. at 12.
119. Subparagraph (g)(1) of the revised rule contains a definition of the term
"person" for the purposes of paragraph (g). In addition to a person to whom securities are offered or sold pursuant to the rule, the definition would include certain rclatives of the person, trusts and estates in which the person and such relatives own all of
the beneficial interest and corporations or other organizations in which the person
and such relatives are beneficial owners of all of each class of equity securities or all
of the equity interest. Furthermore, the definition would provide that beneficial owners
of corporations or business associations that are formed for the specific purpose of
acquiring securities offered in a transaction are to be considered separate persons for
purposes of the proposed rule.
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adviser with discretionary authority, acting on behalf of other persons
120
would be deemed to be offers and sales to such other persons.
However, the Commission has responded to comment by excluding
from the computation of number of purchasers persons who purchase
for cash in an amount not less than $150,000, in a single payment or in
installments. In the original proposal, only cash purchasers for amounts
of $250,000 or greater were excluded.
The following are excluded under the revised rule in determining
the number of purchasers:
1. directors or executive officers of the issuer;
2. any 100 percent owned subsidiary of the issuer or any 100 percent
parent of the issuer;
3. any bank lending money to the issuer where the loan is evidenced only by the issuance of debt securities;
4. employees of the issuer, to the extent of thirty-five in any consecutive twelve month period, who purchase securities pursuant to a
pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, stock option, stock purchase
or similar plan that has been approved by shareholders of the
issuer; and
5. persons acquiring securities in connection with a business combination, to the extent of thirty-five in any consecutive twelve month
period.
F. Conclusion
The Commission indicates that the revised rule "is intended to
be in the nature of an experiment... ."121 Admittedly it is an improvement over its predecessor. However, the conclusion that was reached
through analysis of the original proposal, remains valid. A new federal
securities code must be adopted. The revised rule functions within a
complex of statutes that needs to be unified in order to provide comprehensive, and rational, regulation of an area vital to the nation's
economy.
120. Release No. 5430 at 13.
121. Id. at 7.

